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The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized in State v. Constant'
that article I, section 4 of the 1974 constitution requires compensa-
tion for business losses resulting from a taking, even if the amount
of those losses is greater than the market value of the expropriated
land. This principle is clearly correct; of course, since the compensa-
tion is not limited by the value of the property, there still remains
the difficult task of determining the amount of the business losses,
as is discussed in a Note appearing in this issue.2
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS
Civil Service
Constitutional "reformers" normally advocate short, flexible con-
stitutions and support enhanced legislative power.' Louisiana's
"reformers" in the 1973 constitutional convention, however, con-
sidering both the state's peculiar history of patronage and its ex-
perience with civil service legislation,' demanded the detailed provi-
sions of article X which establish a self-executing merit system, one
that is not subject to legislative change. The convention's decision
was probably an unwise one that will inhibit needed change; how-
ever, the decision was clear: article X, section 2(A) includes in the
classified merit system all state employees, excepting only the posi-
tions enumerated in section 2(B). Among the exceptions are "em-
ployees, deputies, and officers of the legislature and of the offices of
the governor. . ...9'
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979), rev'g, 359 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
2. See Note, Expropriation: Compensating the Landowner to the Full Extent of
His Loss, 40 LA. L. REV. 817 (1980).
3. The Model State Constitution provides simply, "The legislature shall provide
for the establishment and administration of a system of personnel administration in
the civil service of the, state and its civil divisions. Appointments and promotions shall
be based on merit and fitness, demonstrated by examination or by other evidence of
competence." NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. 10,
§ 10.01 (6th rev. ed. 1963).
4. See 3 LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA WITH NOTES AND STUDIES 499-510 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
PROJET].
5. LA. CONST. art. X, § 2(B)(10).
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Smith v. Division of Administration' holds that employees of the
Division of Administration are not in the "office of the governor" and
thus are classified employees. The Division, which employs more
than 1,000 persons, is responsible for the mechanics of state ad-
ministration- budget control, payrolls, purchasing, data processing,
etc.-rather than formulating public policies While legislation has
made the Division a part of the office of the governor,' this legisla-
tive assertion is not a binding definition of the constitutional phrase
"office of the governor." If the legislature were to have the power to
establish additional exceptions from the classified service, the con-
stitution would have used the "as provided by law" formula it used
in so many other contexts.'
The supreme court in Smith reviewed prior law and the constitu-
tional convention debates to support the principle that the phrase
"office of the governor" must be narrowly construed to include only
his personal staff and policy advisors and that the phrase is not a
device which enables the legislature to transfer state departments
into the office and thus out of the classified service. To hold other-
wise would be to subvert the constitution's language and purpose.
Especially strong support for the result in Smith comes from
references by Delegate Stagg in the convention transcripts to the
same Division:
If I'm not too far wrong on my facts here, in recent months,
the Centrex operators were changed from, I think, classified ser-
vice, to be a part of the Division of Administration. I believe in
addition to that, the guards out here on the parking lot may
have similarly, or some other groups of employees were moved
to the Division of Administration and, therefore, I presume, out
from under the classified service.'0
The author of the civil service provisions spoke disapprovingly of
such action. Referring to Murtagh v. Department of City Civil Ser-
vice," Delegate Moise Dennery stated:
6. 362 So. 2d 1101 (La. 1978), overruling In re Division of Administration, 343 So.
2d 277 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 504 (La. 1977).
7. See LA. R.S. 39:4 (1950).
8. LA. R.S. 39:1 (1950) provides: "A division of administration is hereby created
as a division of the office of the governor .... House Concurrent Resolution No. 264
of 1976 was also an attempt by the legislature to express the "intent" of the legisla-
ture that the Division be part of the office of the governor.
9. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-
Louisiana Constitutional Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 438, 442 (1978).
10. 9 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVEN-
TION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 7, 1973, at 2639 [hereinafter cited as RECORDS].
11. 215 La. 1007, 42 So. 2d 65 (1949).
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Mr. Stagg, the only way I can answer that question is to
refer you to a case in New Orleans many years ago when the
mayor of the city at that time did exactly what you suggest
could be done. The court slapped him down and said you could
not enlarge "the office of the governor" by taking in extraneous
divisions and say they are part of his office. It means the office
of the governor in a normal sense of the word."2
A starting place for a more concrete definition of the phrase
"office of the governor" is the wording of section 2(B) itself. The ex-
ception is for "employees, deputies, and officers," a change from an
earlier draft's reference to "administrative officers and employees."
The change, Delegate Dennery explained, was effected because the
word formula "might restrict it to administrative employees
alone."'" The implication is that non-administrative employees are
also excepted, non-administrative in the sense they do not adminis-
ter rules and policies but rather participate in their making. This is
consistent with the basic reason for having an unclassified service in
which hiring is not based on competitive examination and dismissal
is possible absent good cause. Some servants of the governor must
reflect his political views and his policy choices and ought to be
hired on those grounds-otherwise he will be less able to implement
the political policies for which he was elected. Political loyalty and
adherence to party views are matters not capable of being tested by
competitive examination, so hiring should be based on other reasons.
Policy advisors ought to be released, even if they perform well, if
they do not agree with the policies of the newly elected governor.
An additional implication from the language and the Dennery ex-
planation is that some administrative employees are also included
within the exception. Even though such employees neither partici-
pate in making policy choices nor exercise discretion, their closeness
to the governor brings them within the exception. The underlying
notion here must be the need for confidentiality and loyalty to the
governor. The reference in Smith to the "retinue" of the governor"
12. RECORDS, supra note 10.
13. Id. at 2634. The provision can also be traced back to the 1954 Projet of a Con-
stitution where the term "office of the governor" is used. It was explained there:
Most states seem to have made an effort to limit the exemptions from coverage to
positions of a political policy-making nature or to work immediately attached to
such political positions, as, for example, work as a confidential secretary to a
department head or as a deputy administrator .... Excepted positions are usually
of a policy-determining, confidential, or professional nature and do not lend them-
selves to strict classification within the civil service.
PROJET, supra note 4, at 581.
14. 362 So. 2d at 1105.
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implies that a personal staff would be included within the exception,
consistent with the view that such traits as confidentiality and per-
sonal compatibility with the governor are not testable by competi-
tive examination and that such persons ought to be subject to
release by a new governor. In the same pattern are the suggestions
from Smith that the phrase "office of the governor" involves the "in-
dividual who holds the elective office"' 5 and the "employees in the
office of the person elected governor,"1 rather than the institution-
alized administrative apparatus of the executive branch.
It would seem, therefore, that a logical starting point in analyz-
ing whether a particular position is within the "office" of the gover-
nor or of any official is whether the position is either one involving
the making of political and policy choices that ought to reflect the
electorate, or one that involves largely personal services of a confi-
dential nature to an elected policy maker. If either of these condi-
tions are met, it would seem that they would be in the office of the
governor "in a normal sense of the word."' 7
Due Process
Article X is quite specific in protecting classified employees
against a hiring and firing process that would reward political ser-
vice rather than merit. A negative implication from the same provi-
sion is that unclassified employees are not so protected. Neverthe-
less, there is developing a body of case law that grants unclassified
employees some protection against deprivations of their positions
without some due process. Federal statutes, as well as equal protec-
tion concerns and freedom of speech concerns, are being given more
attention in this area.
Patronage Dismissals
In Boyer v. St. Amant,'8 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal sustained an exception of no cause of action in a suit for
wrongful dismissal by a deputy sheriff who alleged that his services
were terminated by a newly elected sheriff as "part of a systematic
purge conducted by the defendant of all persons employed by the
Sheriff's Office who do not and did not support the defendant's
political aspirations. The petitioners have been fired solely due to
their political activities and affiliations .
15. Id. (Emphasis added).
16. Id. at 1107 (Emphasis added).
17. RECORDS, supra note 10, at 2639.
18. 364 So. 2d 1338 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1108 (La. 1978).
19. Transcript of Proceedings Before Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, Peti-
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The court failed to discuss-and the parties failed to raise-the
significant constitutional issue. Since the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Elrod v. Burns," it has been clear that first
amendment freedom of association and expression prohibit the firing
of governmental employees solely because of their support or non-
support of a political candidate. In Elrod, a newly elected Demo-
cratic sheriff in Cook County, Illinois, fired Republican employees in
the office and replaced them with loyal supporters. The facts alleged
in Boyer are virtually indistinguishable from Elrod and would seem
to have required at least a full factual development of the case.
The basic concerns of the court in Elrod- inhibiting freedom of
belief and association by requiring political allegiance for one to
maintain his job, plus the resulting limitations on the free function-
ing of the electoral process 21-are present in Boyer. Even if two
political parties are not involved, the situation is the same where
one is dealing with two different factions in a basically one-party
area.
Under Elrod, public employees in policy making positions can be
dismissed because of their differing political views.2 2 Indeed, in areas
where discretion is to be exercised, the political process requires
replacement of officers who do not represent the views of the major-
ity of the electorate. But, in Boyer, there is no factual record sup-
porting the application of this exception to the general rule. Even
though it is arguable that the plaintiff was not "dismissed" but in-
stead was simply not reappointed at the end of his term, the impact
on political expression is the same in either situation. The difference
between the two types of termination is a matter of form and not of
substance. There is an additional reason for adopting the Elrod prin-
ciple in Louisiana: Article I, section 3 of the constitution provides
that no law shall arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of "political ideas or affilia-
tions."
Dismissal Procedures
Article X, section 8 protects a classified employee by prohibiting
dismissal except for "cause expressed in writing" and by granting a
tion at 3, Boyer v. St. Amant, 364 So. 2d 1338 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So.
2d 1108 (La. 1978).
20. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
21. Id. at 355-56.
22. Id. at 367. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a "confidential"
assistant may be discharged for political reasons, even if the employer is not a policy
maker. Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1979). In Stegmaier the court
upheld the discharge of the only deputy to an elected circuit clerk.
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hearing at which the burden of proof is borne by the governmental
agency. Article X does not extend such protection to unclassified
employees, and the due process clauses of the state and federal con-
stitutions have not been construed to prohibit the firing of govern-
mental employees without a hearing.
Jackson v. East Baton Rouge Parish Indigent Defender's Board23
applied the orthodox view and upheld the dismissal of an unclassi-
fied secretary without a hearing or a showing of cause for the firing.
The case is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Board of Regents v. Roth,2' since the employment was ter-
minable at will and there was no provision in state law or custom
that established any greater entitlement to continued employment.
The federal position, however, is that if there is established by state
law or by institutional custom an expectancy in continued employ-
ment, terminating the employment requires some sort of hearing. In
Perry v. Sinderman,25 for example, there existed at the college a
type of "de facto" tenure under which expectations of continued
employment upon satisfactory service had been supported by a long-
term course of conduct by the governmental agency.
It is then consistent with the line between Roth and Sinderman
for the Louisiana Supreme Court to have held as it did in Haughton
Elevator Division v. Division of Administration." In a scheme where
state law requires granting public contracts to the lowest "responsi-
ble" bidder, the court held that due process requires that the low
bidder not be disqualified without having been given notice of and
the reasons for the disqualification and an opportunity to respond to
the allegations of irresponsibility. Here, it was a state law that
established an expectancy or an entitlement-the right to a public
contract under stated conditions. However, in contrast to public bid
contracts, no such state law or custom established such an expectancy
or an entitlement to continued public employment even if one's ser-
vice was satisfactory.
The position is a convenient one for the courts; they are osten-
sibly making no subjective judgments about the "fundamentalness"
or the importance of various rights. They are looking at the rights
or expectancies established by state law and, if such an expectancy
is established, requiring procedural regularity for its impairment.
23. 353 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1385 (La. 1978).
24. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
25. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
26. 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979). See Note, Shaping Specific Procedural Require-
ments for Disqualification Under Louisiana's Public Bid Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 871
(1980).
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However, this analysis is all too easy. If the evils are political
pressure and favoritism, they exist not only with respect to state
employment but also to state contracts. The legitimate expectations
of private citizens, be they employees or contractors, are hinged on
more fundamental concerns than whether the legislature has de-
clared that the expectation exists. Private citizens' concerns in
employment are worthy of as much protection as their interest in
obtaining a state contract. As Laurence Tribe aptly noted:
While the positivist theory, which would produce a significant
contraction in protection of "liberty" and "property," contains no
internal contradictions, it may be criticized as an unjustifiable
abdication of judicial responsibility. An emphasis on limiting
federal judicial intrusion in state affairs can take one only so far:
the fourteenth amendment, after all, was clearly designed to
place limits on state action adverse to individuals. 7
ELECTIONS
The constitution requires most candidates for state office to
meet the qualifications for their offices as of the date fixed by law
for "qualification as a candidate."28 Judges and district attorneys,
however, must meet their qualifications for office at a different
time-the time of their "election."' While the different treatment of
judicial officers in this regard seems difficult to justify, it is the
product of a deliberate choice by the constitutional convention."
Determining the time of election was simple under the former
election scheme, which included party primaries and run-offs fol-
lowed by a general election; a candidate was elected at the general
election and not before. However, the change to a simpler election
process, without party primaries and with an open primary followed
by general election if necessary, leads to some uncertainty as to
time of election." Arguably, if only two candidates were in a race, or
if one candidate among several received a majority of the votes cast
in the primary, .a candidate would be "elected" after the first pri-
27. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (1978).
28. LA. CONST. art. III, § 4; art. IV, § 2.
29. LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 24 & 26. While the attorney general must meet the age,
citizenship, and elector requirement as of the date of qualification as a candidate, the
five year law practice requirement is tested as of the date of "his election." LA. CONST.
art. IV, § 2.
30. Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA.
L. REV. 765, 819 (1977).
31. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of article XI, section 1, the legislature
adopted an Election Code which became effective January 1, 1978. 1976 La. Acts, No.
697, amending LA. R.S. 18:1-1466 (1950).
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mary, even though a second election was scheduled to be conducted
some time later.3 2 It would be possible for this candidate to obtain
the most votes and then be retroactively disqualified because his
"election" came at the first election and no second race was neces-
sary. To avoid this kind of uncertainty, the courts of appeal have
construed the constitutional requirement to mean that the candidate
must meet the qualifications as of the date established by law for
the general election. In Cook v. Campbell,33 Judge Hall explained:
The date of the general election is certain and ascertainable
in both regular and special elections. The interpretation of "elec-
tion" urged by plaintiff would leave the determinative date un-
certain and dependent on how many candidates qualify and,
where there are more than two candidates, on whether one can-
didate receives a majority of the votes cast in the first primary,
matters which cannot be determined until after expiration of the
qualifying period or after the primary election.'
McKenzie v. Edwards5 legitimates a system under which judges
can resign effective at a future date so that a successor can be
elected to take office immediately upon the effective date of the in-
cumbent's resignation. In McKenzie, two incumbent judges of the
Baton Rouge City Court filed declarations on August 1, 1978, ex-
pressing their intention to resign Janaury 1, 1979, when they were
to be sworn in as district judges. In order to fill the vacancies, the
governor then called a special election to be held at the same time
as a regularly scheduled election. Considerations of economy no
doubt came into play in the decision, for this procedure can some-
times save cost by avoiding special elections. Additionally, as Chief
Justice Summers argued, it is consistent with the convention policy
of having elected judges, for the procedure obviates the necessity of
appointing temporary judges to fill the vancancies pending an elec-
tion. Nonetheless, there is some doubt as to whether the decision is
consistent with article V, section 22 of the constitution, which pro-
vides: "A . . . vacancy in the office of a judge shall be filled by
special election called by the governor and held within six months
after the day on which the vacancy occurs . . . ." Article X, section
28 also indicates: "A vacancy, as used in this Constitution, shall oc-
32. LA. R.S. 18:511 (Supp. 1979) provides: "A candidate who receives a majority of
the votes cast for an office in a primary election is elected."
33. 360 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 573 (La. 1978).
34. 360 So. 2d at 1197. See also Seale v. Caldwell, 360 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 573 (La. 1978); Jory v. Arnette, 360 So. 2d 921 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1978).
35. 361 So. 2d 880 (La. 1978).
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cur in the event of death, resignation, removal by any means, or
failure to take office for any reason."
On a word analysis alone, it would seem that the reference is to
a vacancy as a fact, and not as the expression of an intention to
resign in the future and produce a vacancy. It is a vacancy in the
office of a judge that is referred to in section 22; the reference is
also to a vacancy that occurs. If one were to refer to the expression
of an intention to resign, the reference would be to filing, deposit-
ing, forwarding, etc. of a resignation, rather than to a vacancy occur-
ring.". Additional support for this view comes from the fact that the
contemplated special election cannot occur before the judge leaves
the office-the reference is to the election being within six months
"after the day on which the vacancy occurs." If elections prior to the
vacancy had been contemplated, a different word choice would have
been made.
In section 28, the reference to "resignation" is used in conjunc-
tion with three other expressions -death, removal, and failure to
take office. Death obviously would not be an event for which one
could declare an anticipatory vacancy. Removal would not occur un-
til a stated procedure was completed. Failure to take office similarly
refers to a fact of the office being vacant. In like manner, resigna-
tion would seem to be consistent with the view that it is an event
that is contemplated rather than a statement of intent to resign at a
future time.
Indeed, if the vacancy is considered to occur upon filing a letter
of anticipatory resignation, when is the six-month time period for
holding the election to run? From the time of filing the letter? From
the time of the date of the resignation? What if the resignation let-
ter states an intention to resign more than six months later?
The argument has more than word analysis to support it. The
convention sought to protect the judicial electoral process from in-
fluence through gubernatorial appointments to vacant judgeships."
This policy was chosen over one of election cost savings. An attempt
to amend the committee proposal, to say simply that "[e]lection of
judges shall be as provided by law," was rejected by a vote of
36. The 1974 constitution establishes a procedure for state officials to declare
their inability to perform their duties; the references are to an official who "transmits
to the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Representatives a written declara-
tion .... " LA. CONST. art. IV, § 17 (Emphasis added). Contrast the constitutional lan-
guage with Revised Statutes 18:581, which states that a vacancy occurs "when the
office is or will be unoccupied .... " (Emphasis added.) The "will be" reference is lack-
ing in the constitution.
37. Hargrave, supra note 30, at 815.
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15-99." Also rejected was an attempt by Delegate Rayburn to abol-
ish the special election procedure and instead have the election to
fill a vacancy "at the next regularly scheduled congressional or
statewide election."89 Debate on the Rayburn amendment shows a
rejection of his aim of "attempting here to save the taxpayers some
money by not having to call special elections so often.""0 The conven-
tion rejected the amendment and knowingly kept the committee pro-
posal language." It can be argued that the choice was not a wise one
and that the choice results in some instances in greater cost; yet it
was a clearly posed choice and the delegates adopted the detailed
proposal.
Also involved is the fact that no constitutional mechanism exists
to make a future resignation binding. Though the McKenzie opinion
states "[tihese resignations were accepted when the Governor issued
his proclamation .. .[and] became irrevocable, creating a vacancy in
the office,"'2 no constitutional authority exists to support this con-
tention. 3 At the least, some uncertainty as to this issue exists; and
it is not desirable for such uncertainties to be the basis on which to
conduct elections which may later be invalidated. Indeed, the majori-
ty opinion must hedge on this point: "When the event is so certain
to occur there is no legal impediment to anticipating the vacancies
.... "" The implication is that if the event is not so certain to occur,
an anticipatory resignation statement would be treated otherwise.
One might argue that, despite the fact that the text and the
legislative history are contrary to McKenzie, there is some flexibil-
ity in the references to an undefined term like "resignation" and
that the decision is justifiable construction, albeit strained, to effec-
38. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973, Aug. 18, 1973, at 4; 1 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973: JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 18, 1973, at 341.
39. Id.
40. 6 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVEN-
TION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 18, 1973, at 822.
41. Id. at 823.
42. 361 So. 2d at 882.
43. Compare Revised Statutes 18:654, which states a resignation is irrevocable
three days after the day on which the secretary of state has transmitted the notice to
the appropriate authority. That provision was not relied upon in McKenzie, and the
case depends on independent constitutional authority of the governor to call the
special election. Even so, there is some doubt as to whether the statute applies to
judges; and, if there is a constitutional right to a full term in one's office, there may be
no power in the legislature to make an anticipated resignation irrevocable.
44. 361 So. 2d at 883. In a concurring opinion, Justice Dennis indicates the effec-
tive date of the resignation could be delayed "for a reasonable period of time," appar-
ently indicating some limits on the freedom to anticipate the resignation date. 361 So.
2d at 883 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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tuate an important policy of saving election costs and avoiding tem-
porary appointments in judgeships. This may be true, but there is
also another important policy being advanced by disallowing antici-
patory resignations. The problem here is that manipulations of
resignation dates can be used to manipulate the holding of elections
so as to favor or disfavor certain candidates. There is room for this
kind of manipulation by the governor and by judges who are resign-
ing. This is exactly the kind of gubernatorial influence the conven-
tion sought to eliminate from the judicial election process. In
McKenzie, for example, if the case were decided otherwise the city
court judgeships would have been filled by an election held at a dif-
ferent time from that of the district court judgeships in Baton
Rouge, giving the election quite a different flavor. Whether that dif-
ference would be good or bad, it still would have been a difference.
A random variable has been replaced by a manipulatable one,
manipulatable by incumbents and a governor. Additionally, under
the Election Code, regular elections are scheduled in such a manner
that the vacancy would invariably be filled at a regularly scheduled
election without the necessity for calling a special election at which
no other elections will occur. 5
45. LA. R.S. 18:402E (Supp. 1979).
